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BOOMERANG OR BACKFIRE?  
HAVE WE BEEN TELLING THE WRONG STORY ABOUT LOVELACE V. 
CANADA AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ICCPR? 
 
ANDREW M. ROBINSON * 
 
What effect, if any, do international human rights treaties have on domestic policy – and further 
– how would we know? This article seeks to begin to answer these questions by introducing a 
methodology to assess the impact of international human rights treaties on domestic policy. The 
article illustrates the efficacy of this methodology through a case study concerning the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and, more specifically, the Human 
Rights Committee’s (HRC) view in Lovelace v. Canada. (UN 1981) Lovelace concerned 
sexually discriminatory rules in Canada’s Indian Act governing marriage and access to Indian 
status. 
In assessing the impact of Lovelace upon Canadian public policy, I consider two possible 
narratives. One popular, if not universally accepted, narrative basically reflects Keck and 
Sikkink’s boomerang pattern, by which nongovernmental actors leverage political change at 
home by utilizing international actors and organizations to put pressure on their government. 
(1998: 12-13) According to this narrative, Lovelace “… led to legislative change by the 
Canadian Parliament”, (Kaufman and Roberge 2003: 10) which removed sexually discriminatory 
sections from the Indian Act in 1985. This story has been repeated by the federal government,1 
legal commentators, (Moss 1989-1990: 294; McKay-Panos 2003); aboriginal scholars (Boldt and 
Long 1985: 173) and non-governmental organizations. (MADRE 2005) Stories such as this, 
which present Canada as complying with the views of international human rights bodies, 
contribute to the credibility of Canada’s foreign policy of promoting human rights 
internationally. (DFAIT 2005)2 In contrast to the boomerang pattern, a second narrative, which I 
will call the “backfire”, presents the efforts of nongovernmental actors as having effects quite 
different from, even the opposite of, what they had intended. This narrative presents the federal 
government as using Lovelace to weaken the position of domestic aboriginal organizations to 
achieve its own objectives.  
Thus, by applying the methodology advanced in this article, we discover that the impact 
of Lovelace on Canadian domestic politics was more complex, and paradoxical, than is generally 
understood. On the one hand, we find that the boomerang pattern narrative which suggests that 
Lovelace led to the 1985 amendments to the Indian Act cannot be supported. On the other hand, 
something in the nature of a backfire does appear to have occurred. We observe that the federal 
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government appears to have used a clever strategy to exploit weaknesses in the ICCPR’s 
compliance system to help it achieve a policy outcome that it had been seeking for some time. In 
considering why this strategy succeeded, lessons are drawn about the importance of transparency 
and publicity for human rights treaty systems. 
This article, then, should be of interest to readers for any or all of the following reasons: 
as a description and application of its methodology (sections 1 and 2); as a challenge to 
reconsider the impact of Lovelace (section 2); and finally, as a lesson in how boomerangs can 
backfire and how this might be avoided. (section 3).  
 
ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 
This paper employs a multilevel governance framework to assess whether a treaty has had a 
determinative effect on domestic public policy. While it is true that many objectives are 
associated with international human rights treaties – encouraging education, information transfer, 
shifts in legal and political consciousness, individual responsibility, and behaviour change3 – I 
chose to focus on determinative effects on public policy for three reasons.  
1. While a treaty may have many domestic effects, determinative effects are most likely to 
be open to observation and analysis.  
2. Determinative effects are clearly linked to the enhancement of individuals’ enjoyment of 
human rights.   
3. As the case study illustrates, by seeking determinative effects, we are likely to gain 
insight into other important effects as well as the processes by which human rights 
treaties influence domestic policy.  
Given our focus on determinative effects, the multilevel governance framework has much 
to recommend it. As an approach to understanding supranational governance, it assumes “… that 
authority and policy making influence is shared across subnational, national and supranational 
levels”. (O’Brien 2002) It is attractive because it requires us to focus on vertical relations 
between domestic political systems and the ICCPR system, and to ask empirical questions about 
effectiveness. Effectiveness, of course, has to be operationalized: effectiveness in terms of what? 
I take my cue from Brown (2002) when he writes: “The fact of multilevel governance exists. The 
more important question may be what difference does it make? Do policy outcomes differ from 
those that would be made by national governments acting without supranational governance…?” 
I like this formulation because it focuses attention on what we are interested in – effects on 
domestic policy – while avoiding debates about whether such effects constitute limitations on 
national sovereignty. One thing I would add to Brown’s formulation is that we also want to know 
whether the difference in policy outcomes was positive, in the sense that domestic policy became 
more consistent with the aims of the treaty, or negative, in the sense that it became less 
consistent. 
To make this assessment, I have developed an analytical methodology based upon the 
work of Ronald B. Mitchell. Mitchell’s methodology has to be adapted, as he is concerned with 
assessing the effectiveness of environmental treaties in addressing intentional oil pollution at sea 
and his work is situated within a global governance framework, which, as O’Brien notes, differs 
from multilevel governance by focusing on horizontal relations between international regimes, 
multinational corporations, and international civil society at the system level. This said, his work 
provides a useful analytical approach and, perhaps more importantly, a rich analytical language 
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for assessing the effects of international treaties. Of particular value is the distinction he draws 
between compliance as “… an actor’s behaviour that conforms to a treaty’s explicit rules” and 
treaty-induced compliance as a subset of compliant behaviour, which refers to “… behaviour that 
conforms with such rules because of the treaty’s compliance system”. (1996: 5, emphasis in 
original) This reminds us that the mere fact of a positive policy change does not necessarily 
demonstrate that a treaty has been effective. 
To operationalize this distinction, I follow Mitchell by assuming that treaties do not affect 
policy outcomes, and designing my analysis so as to identify “… empirical evidence … of the 
type needed to falsify this assumption”. (1994: 18) A successful falsification must contain three 
elements: a correlation between the requirements of a treaty and subsequent compliant state 
behaviour; evidence that demonstrates how the treaty “… could have led to the observed change 
in behavior”; and a demonstration “… that the treaty rule, rather than other factors, caused the 
chain of events involved”. The final element requires consideration of rival explanations and the 
effect of exogenous factors. (1994: 22-23) Only where all three elements can be established can 
we conclude that a treaty has had a determinative effect (that is, it was effective). While it might 
be nice to translate these elements into a step-by-step process that could be applied in all cases, 
this does not appear possible. Rather, as I illustrate in the next section, the elements must be 
tailored to the fit the nature of each particular case. 
 
CASE-STUDY: THE ICCPR AND LOVELACE V. CANADA 
In this section I do two things. First, I apply the three elements of Mitchell’s general analysis to 
consider whether Lovelace had a determinative effect on Canadian public policy. Second, in the 
process, I continue adapting Mitchell’s methodology for application to the ICCPR, drawing only 
upon those aspects of his methodology and of the ICCPR treaty-monitoring system that are 
relevant to addressing this question. 
 
Correlation Between Treaty and Compliant Behaviour 
The first step in any attempt to falsify the assumption that a treaty has had no effect on public 
policy is to identify policy changes that constitute prima facie examples of the treaty having had 
an effect. As Manzer has observed, there are a number of places one can look for evidence of 
such changes in the Canadian case: “… judicial protection of rights in the common law; 
legislative protection of rights in public statutes; and entrenchment of rights in the constitution”. 
(1988: 35) 
The basic facts regarding Lovelace provide such prima facie evidence. Sandra Lovelace 
was born and raised a status Indian on the Tobique reserve in New Brunswick. Having married, 
and subsequently divorced, a man who was not a status Indian in 1970, she lost her Indian status 
under Indian Act section 12(1)(b). This section had a discriminatory effect: if a status Indian man 
married a woman who did not have Indian status, he retained his status and his wife and any 
subsequent children acquired it; if a status Indian woman married a man who did not have status, 
however, she lost her status and could not pass it onto her children. Further, as only status 
Indians could reside permanently on reserve as a matter of right, Ms. Lovelace lost this as well.  
 Canada ratified the ICCPR in 1976. In December of 1977 Ms. Lovelace communicated 
her claim to the HRC that section 12(1)(b) violated a number of rights under the ICCPR. In 1981 
the HRC issued its view that section 12(1)(b) violated ICCPR Article 27 rights of persons 
belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities. While I will discuss the substance of the 
HRC’s view in more depth below, the key point was that it said that denying Ms. Lovelace 
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Indian status, and thus the right to reside on her home reserve, was unjustified because it was not 
“… reasonable, or necessary to preserve the identity of the tribe”. (Lovelace, para. 17) In 1985 
Canada enacted Bill C-31, which, among other things, amended the Indian Act by repealing and 
replacing section 12(1)(b). As Bill C-31 was enacted four years after the publication of Lovelace, 
this appears to represent the ICCPR having affected Canadian public policy.  
 
Evidence That the Treaty Could Have Been Responsible 
The second element in a falsification of the assumption that a treaty had no effect is evidence 
that the treaty could have been responsible for the policy change. If no causal connection can be 
established, then we cannot rule out the possibility that the change was coincidental. To consider 
how to demonstrate such a connection I draw upon Mitchell’s analysis of the causes of 
compliance and noncompliance, including his model of the treaty compliance system. 
To argue that a treaty caused a policy change, we need a theory of how treaties generate 
compliance. This presupposes assumptions about the causes of non-compliance. Mitchell 
suggests three:  
• preference, where a state ratifies a treaty, has the capacity to comply, but chooses not to; 
• incapacity, where a state is willing to comply, but does not because it lacks the 
administrative, financial, technological, or other means to do so; and  
• inadvertence, where a state takes “… actions sincerely intended and expected to achieve 
compliance but nonetheless fail[s] to meet treaty standards.” (1996: 13)  
Given this account of non-compliance, treaties are assumed to generate compliance in one of two 
ways: through positive inducements designed to address incapacity and inadvertence by 
providing financial incentives, technology transfers, or education to “… clarify treaty 
requirements and identify strategies for compliance”; or negative sanctions, the threat or use of 
which is intended to “… make the expected costs of violation exceed those of compliance”. 
(Mitchell 1996: 14) Where a treaty has not been a factor in removing such impediments to 
compliance, we must resist the conclusion that it affected public policy.4 
This raises a further question: where should we look for evidence that a treaty has helped 
remove an impediment? Mitchell’s answer is found in his model of how treaties can affect 
domestic policy: the compliance system. A compliance system is “… that subset of the treaty’s 
rules and procedures that influence the compliance level of a given rule”. Mitchell divides the 
compliance system into three parts: the primary rule system, the compliance information system, 
and the non-compliance response system. The compliance system is crucial since, as Mitchell 
notes, “… these three systems provide a framework for identifying the source of such variance in 
inducing compliance”. (1996: 17) Before turning to Lovelace, we must consider the meaning of 
each part of the compliance system in general and as it applies to the ICCPR.  
 The primary rule system “… consists of the actors, rules and processes related to the 
behaviour that is the substantive target of the regime”. It is reflected in the definition of the 
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problem, the choice of solution, and the institutions that will be put in place to achieve the 
solution. This, in turn, determines who and which activities will be regulated, the changes in 
behaviour that will be required, the cost of such changes, the exogenous factors that will come 
into play, the degree of transparency of the overall system, and the degree of specificity in 
requirements. (Mitchell 1996: 17-19) The ICCPR’s primary rule system designates states party 
to the treaty as the actors to be regulated. Its rules include a list of civil and political rights which 
states are expected to respect in their relations with persons within their jurisdiction. The 
ICCPR’s chief solution to human rights violations is to place primary responsibility on states to 
“… adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights 
recognized in [the ICCPR]” and to provide remedies to any person whose rights or freedoms 
have been violated (Article 2).  
 The compliance information system “… consists of the actors, rules and processes that 
collect, analyze and disseminate information regarding the instances of, and parties responsible 
for, violations and compliance”. (Mitchell 1996: 17) The more it maximizes transparency, the 
more it contributes to inducing compliance. “Transparency refers to both the amount and quality 
of the information collected on compliance or non-compliance by the regulated actors as well as 
the degree of analysis and dissemination.” A key assumption is that for actors to be influenced by 
the non-compliance response system, they “… must know that their choices will not go 
unnoticed”. (19) The central actor in the ICCPR’s compliance information system is the HRC, 
and the information system that concerns us is provided by the ICCPR’s First Optional Protocol 
(OP). The OP allows the HRC to “… receive and consider communications from individuals 
who claim to be victims of [ICCPR rights] violations by that State Party” (Article 1). After 
considering written submissions from state and communicant the HRC issues its opinion as to 
whether a violation has occurred. While the legal status of these views is uncertain, the HRC has 
used them to propose remedies for violations including compensation, the release of a prisoner, 
and changes in legislation. (Joseph, Schulz, and Castans 2000: 14) One way that this system 
could help induce compliance is that by finding a violation, the HRC could remove from a state 
“… the excuse of inadvertence and misinterpretation.” (Mitchell 1996: 19) 
 The non-compliance response system “… consists of the actors, rules, and processes 
governing the formal and informal responses undertaken to induce those identified as in non-
compliance to comply”. Possibilities include providing positive inducements such as funds, 
information, or technology and enforcing negative sanctions. (Mitchell 1996: 17, 20-23) Human 
rights treaties are notoriously weak in this regard. Unlike trade agreements that can authorize 
economic sanctions to punish violators and environmental agreements that can be enforced 
through specific reciprocity – “… promising to comply if others comply and threatening to 
violate if others violate” (Mitchell 1996: 16) – the ICCPR provides no strong means of 
enforcement. 
This does not mean that the non-compliance response systems of human rights treaties 
cannot induce compliance; few international organizations have the power to enforce their rules 
without the cooperation of states or civil society actors. As Oran Young argues, compliance is 
possible without enforcement and, where enforcement is required, it is not necessary that 
international organizations acquire the powers traditionally associated with governments to carry 
it out. (Young 1999: Chapter 4) The primary way the HRC may induce compliance is by 
influencing public opinion, both domestic and international. To acknowledge this, however, we 
must modify, or at least clarify, Mitchell’s methodology. Mitchell says that compliant behaviour 
should not be treated as treaty-induced where the treaty “… provides international legitimacy 
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which increases domestic political support enough to enable the government to implement a 
desired but otherwise unattainable policy”, or where the state acts out of fear of “adverse public 
opinion, domestically or internationally”. (1996: 7-8) Clearly, if this was applied to human rights 
treaties few, if any, would be found to be effective. I believe this can be addressed without 
sacrificing analytical rigour by focusing on the origin of changes in political support and public 
opinion. If changes that alter a state’s preference or enable it to overcome its incapacity have 
their origin in a treaty’s compliance system, this should be considered treaty-induced; if the 
origin lies elsewhere, then it should not. 
This discussion draws our attention to the fact that dissemination is the weakest aspect of 
the ICCPR’s compliance system. Many of the HRC’s hearings and deliberations are conducted 
behind closed doors and its main reporting requirement is the submission of an annual report to 
the United Nations General Assembly through the Economic and Social Council. (ICCPR Article 
45) While the HRC has published representative collections of its views in response to 
communications under the OP, and most of its other views are accessible on the Internet, 
dissemination has not been the HRC’s strong suit. 
Returning to the impact of Lovelace, the Canadian government itself suggested that there 
was a connection between Bill C-31 and the ICCPR’s compliance information system. For 
instance, when C-31 was introduced in the House of Commons, then-Secretary of State for 
External Affairs, Joe Clark, (1985) reminded his listeners of the HRC’s view and said, “… by 
having the House adopt this Bill, Canada will meet its obligations and eliminate that 
discrimination”. 
  
Evaluation of Rival Explanations 
So far, the evidence supports the first two of the three elements required to falsify the assumption 
that Bill C-31 did not represent Lovelace having a positive determinative effect on Canadian 
policy. We must now consider the third, and most complex, element: the evaluation of rival 
explanations. As Mitchell suggests, this requires seeking evidence to rule out the possibility that 
the state would have acted as it did “… even absent positive inducements or negative sanctions”. 
(1996: 9) In other words, we must be careful to “… avoid attributing causation to [treaty] rules in 
cases in which other factors are responsible for changes in compliance”. (Mitchell 1994: 66)  
As regards human rights treaties, the most relevant rival explanations concern what 
Mitchell calls compliance as independent self-interest. This generally occurs either where treaty 
rules are “… brought in line with existing or intended future behaviours, and not vice versa” or 
where the state’s motivation to comply is derived from factors outside the compliance system. 
Where either cause can be established, we cannot call a policy change treaty-induced 
compliance. (1996: 7-9) With respect to Lovelace, the most important rival explanation is that 
the federal government was going to arrive at the policy represented in Bill C-31 irrespective of 
Ms. Lovelace’s communication. We will assess this rival explanation by asking four questions, 
any of which, if answered in the affirmative, would falsify the assumption that Lovelace had no 
effect on the policy outcome. These are: Did Lovelace put Indian Act section 12(1)(b) on the 
political agenda? Did Lovelace change the federal government’s position? Did Lovelace affect 
the timing of the outcome? Did Lovelace influence the shape of the policy? 
Did Lovelace put Indian Act section 12(1)(b) on the political agenda? Lovelace did 
not put Indian Act section 12(1)(b) on the political agenda; it had been there long before Ms. 
Lovelace sent her communication in 1977. In August 1968 a federal minister had raised the issue 
with Indian leaders; (The Globe and Mail 1968) in almost every session of Parliament from 1969 
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to 1979 a private member’s bill had been introduced calling for the section’s repeal; the 1970 
report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women had called for the section’s repeal 
(Jamieson 1978: 80); and a 1971 government discussion paper on the Indian Act had presented 
options for addressing the issue. (Canada 1971)5 The event that had the greatest effect, however, 
was the decision of Jeannette Lavell to challenge her loss of status under the section as a 
violation of the sexual equality provisions in the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights. After Lavell won 
at the Federal Court of Appeal in October 1971, section 12(1)(b) had become a national issue. 
Did Lovelace change the federal government’s position? Lovelace did not change the 
federal government’s position on the issue; its position appears to have been fairly consistent 
since at least 1974. To properly understand this position, we must examine the competing 
pressures the government faced from key players in what we might call the Indian-status policy 
community. 
A good place to start is with the federal government’s response to the Federal Court of 
Appeal’s decision in Lavell. Had the government chosen not to appeal this decision, the issue 
might have been settled in 1971. As it turned out, the Supreme Court overturned Lavell, thus 
reinstating the status quo. After deciding to launch the appeal, the Justice Minister offered this 
justification in the Commons:  
This is a very important case, Mr. Speaker. It is important with respect to 
women’s rights and the status of women upon marriage; it is an important case 
with respect to Indians as a group and as a people; and it is an important case 
because it places a further interpretation on the application of the Canadian Bill of 
Rights with regard to the concept of ‘equality before the law.’ (Turner 1971) 
Reflected in this statement are key actors and issues in the Indian-status policy community: 
women and sexual discrimination; Indians and aboriginal rights; and as originator of both the 
Indian Act and the Canadian Bill of Rights, the federal government. To understand the federal 
position requires considering these actors, their positions, and their relative strength. 
 The women’s position was promoted by various native and non-native women’s groups. 
These groups had very different stakes in the issue. Non-native women’s groups, such as the 
Advisory Council on the Status of Women and the National Action Committee on the Status of 
Women, defined their demands for repeal of the section primarily in terms of sexual equality. 
(Bell 1973; Hosek in Canada 1985: 5) The main group representing non-status Indian women in 
the 1970s, Indian Rights for Indian Women (IRIW), had been formed by women who supported 
Lavell in her court case. As its name indicates, IRIW viewed the issue as a matter of fair access 
to Indian status and rights. This perspective is reflected in Lavell’s characterization of her “… 
battle as more a question of human rights, than of women’s rights. ‘We are not even asking for 
equality with Indian men,’ she said. …‘Everyone should be legally an Indian, if they are an 
Indian. If they are white, they should be white’.” (Platiel 1973) Finally, the Native Women’s 
Association of Canada [NWAC], the major status Indian women’s group, appears to have felt the 
pull of both sexual equality and Indian self-determination. Its position is illustrated by Marlene 
Pierre-Aggamaway: “… When I was the president of [NWAC], I was criticized by some for the 
stand I took, which was that Section 12(1)(b) must be removed from the Indian Act, but there is 
something more integral to our survival, and that is the entrenchment of aboriginal and treaty 
rights in the constitution.” (1983: 68) Despite their differences, all the groups desired the 
removal of sexual discrimination from the Indian Act. Their influence is suggested by the 
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decision of Noel Starblanket, president of the National Indian Brotherhood, to urge provincial 
Indian organizations to take public stands on the issue because “… so much pressure was being 
applied to the federal government by women’s groups that if Indian organizations did not make 
their position known soon, ‘the government will attempt to force one on us’.” (White 1978) 
 Most status Indian organizations, led by the national umbrella group the National Indian 
Brotherhood (NIB), defined the issue in terms of aboriginal and treaty rights. This is 
understandable; twice since 1969 Indians had faced the prospect that the Indian Act, and with it 
Indian status, might be eliminated without their consent. In 1969 the federal government had 
issued a white paper that had proposed repealing the Indian Act and removing all references to 
Indians from the Constitution. (DIAND 1969) In 1971 the Lavell case had raised the possibility 
that the courts might interpret the Canadian Bill of Rights to invalidate the Indian Act. (Whyte 
1974: 29) In this context, the NIB had developed a nuanced position; while it was in favour of 
eliminating sexual discrimination from the Indian Act, it opposed unilateral federal action. This 
position was supported by a number of reinforcing arguments.6 First, the NIB was opposed in 
principle to the federal government amending the Indian Act on any matter without first 
consulting and receiving the approval of Indians. The NIB won an important victory on this front 
in February 1975 when the federal cabinet agreed not to introduce any changes to the Indian Act 
without first having them “… cleared through a joint meeting of the National Indian Brotherhood 
executive council and the cabinet committee especially set up to meet with the Brotherhood 
council.” (Cardinal 1979: 49) Second, many Indian bands claimed the power to determine their 
membership as an aboriginal right. (Platiel 1971) Third, since at least 1973 the NIB had rejected 
what it called “… a piecemeal approach to revision of the membership sections,” (Sanders 1974: 
414) calling instead for the removal of all forms of discrimination from the Indian Act. Fourth, 
and perhaps most importantly, the status Indian leadership feared that if the federal government 
were allowed to deal with sexual discrimination first, it would lose interest and never get around 
to revising the Indian Act in ways important to Indians. (David Ahenakew in Canada 1982: Issue 
1: 66-7) While, in retrospect, this position appears to have been based on legitimate concerns, it 
did not serve status Indian organizations well in the court of public opinion; it was criticized in 
some quarters as a strategy of holding Indian women hostage or using them as pawns, by 
attempting to leverage the federal government’s embarrassment over section 12(1)(b) to get 
attention paid to other demands. (Hurst 1978; Winnipeg Free Press 1980) 
The other major player in this policy community was the federal government, as 
represented primarily by the cabinet. The government’s explicitly acknowledged position seems 
to have been intended to portray it as an honest broker; while its declared policy since 1974, 
(Munro 1974: 187) and repeated by every Minister of Indian Affairs thereafter, was to end the 
sexual discrimination, it also claimed an inability to act because of its commitment to consult 
with Indian organizations. This argument was invoked, for example, by the Minister of Justice in 
1977 to defend the government’s decision to exempt the Indian Act from the application of the 
new Canadian Human Rights Act: “… making the discrimination illegal under the human rights 
bill would be seen as unilateral government action interfering with the Indians. … and could hurt 
consultations with the National Indian Brotherhood. … Indians must eliminate the discrimination 
themselves through consultation on reform of the Indian Act.”(Winnipeg Free Press 1977)  
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Two additional factors also appear to have influenced the government’s position, but 
were not acknowledged so explicitly. One was the financial implication. Money was involved 
because any change to the rules that would increase the number of status Indians would increase 
the cost of providing benefits to status Indians. And further, since Indian status and band 
membership overlapped at the time, Indians who regained their status would also regain the right 
to reside on reserve, potentially increasing federal obligations to provide housing and other 
benefits only available to on-reserve Indians. Thus, as Sally Weaver noted “… when the 
government began to examine seriously the options for changing the legislation, the overriding 
fiscal policies in Ottawa were recasting the issue from one of principle to one of pragmatic 
financing”. (1983: 75-6) There is abundant evidence to support the suggestion that financial and 
demographic implications were always key factors when the government considered this matter.7 
 The other factor that appears to have influenced the government’s position is that the 
obvious’ solution – simple repeal of the section – was not practical. Section 12(1)(b), as was 
noted by learned commentators, was only one part of the complex set of rules that constituted the 
Indian status and band membership system in Canada; (Sanders in Canada 1982: 5: 17; Fleming 
in Canada 1982: 2: 87-95) for instance, reinstating Indian women who had lost their status raised 
further questions concerning the rights and status of the non-Indian spouse, of the children 
resulting from the mixed-marriage, and of subsequent generations who, of course, might 
themselves marry people with or without status. Thus, any serious attempt to repeal the section 
would require rethinking the entire status and band membership system.  
In sum, the government’s position was basically fixed before Ms. Lovelace sent her 
communication. It wanted to respond to women’s groups and remove a source of acute 
embarrassment, but its willingness to amend the Indian Act was constrained by concerns about 
cost, complexity, and opposition from status Indian organizations. 
Did Lovelace Affect the Timing of the Outcome? Even if Lovelace did not put Indian 
Act section 12(1)(b) on the agenda and it did not change the federal government’s position, it 
may still have had an effect by affecting the timing of the policy change: that is, the change may 
have occurred sooner than it would have otherwise. To understand this possibility, we must 
consider a further aspect of the Indian-status policy community that appears to have contributed 
to the government’s failure to act. 
Besides the daunting complexity of the task, another reason the government failed to act 
appears to have been the conflicting nature of the demands made by key players in the policy 
community. It was not that any of the key players favoured sexual discrimination, for none did. 
Rather, it was the competing and, at least partially, mutually exclusive nature of their demands. 
                                                 
7
 For instance, within days of Lavell’s 1971 victory in the Federal Court of Appeal, a Department of Indian Affairs 
official suggested that a decision to reinstate might affect as many as 5,000 women. (The Globe and Mail 1971) In 
1978, the Department of Indian Affairs released a series of discussion papers on amending the Indian Act in which it 
estimated the additional numbers of women and children who would be eligible for Indian status under its proposals 
and noted that since “… federal funds are limited, the effects of adding beneficiaries will have to be borne in mind.” 
(DIAND 1978) Following Lovelace’s 1981 victory at the UN, a cabinet document was leaked which urged the 
government to end sexual discrimination, but warned that the cost could “… range from a low of $312.2 million to a 
high of $556.7 million”. (Halifax Chronicle-Herald 1981) A 1982 discussion paper described options which were 
eventually incorporated into Bill C-31 as allowing “… the Government to have some kind of control over its 
expenses” and as limiting “… the future growth of the Indian population and [reducing] the pressure on scarce band 
resources.” (DIAND 1982: 6, 14) During the third reading debate of Bill C-47 in June of 1984 (a failed Liberal bill 
similar to C-31), the Minister of Indian Affairs said “… the horrendous expense” was one of the reasons the 
government decided not to extend reinstatement to Indian status beyond “… people who lost their status plus one 
generation.” (Munro 1984) 
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Status Indian organizations were willing to resolve the sexual discrimination issue, but only after 
the federal government dealt with other key concerns, including ceding them control over 
defining their membership. Indian women who had lost their status wanted the federal 
government to reinstate them and their children before it gave bands control over membership. 
Non-native women’s groups were almost exclusively concerned with sexual discrimination. 
 The cumulative effect of these demands may be described as something akin to a policy 
logjam. On the one hand, as Sally Weaver suggested, by 1977 the federal government was under 
extreme pressure to address the sexual discrimination issue. (1993: 102) On the other hand, while 
the federal government may have desired to do this, it does not appear to have been inclined to 
expend the time and political capital to actually achieve it: this would have required either 
opening up the whole Indian Act, as the status Indian organizations demanded, or moving 
forward over their resistance, as many women’s groups were demanding. The result, as Sanders 
observed in 1975, was that federal politicians “… deferred on the question because of the 
proposed revision of the Indian Act. Indian issues are sufficiently marginal, politically, that there 
seems to be a good possibility of the status quo being continued indefinitely.” (1975: 672) It is in 
this logjam, and, more precisely, in the fact that sufficient pressure was added to break it, that we 
find the possibility that Lovelace, and thus the ICCPR, may have had an effect. 
 Despite this very real possibility, I am compelled to conclude that, while Lovelace may 
have added to the pressure that made federal action possible, it was not the determining factor. 
The real determining factor, I believe, was the potential financial implications flowing from the 
enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982 and its Charter of Rights and Freedoms. While the new 
Constitution Act was proclaimed in 1982, the application of the equality rights provision (section 
15) was delayed for three years to allow governments to adjust their legislation. The federal 
government took the position that once the section 15 guarantee of sexual equality came into 
effect on April 17, 1985, the courts would find Indian Act section 12(1)(b) unconstitutional. I 
believe concern about this deadline, which the government set for itself, and not the Lovelace 
decision, was the key determinant of the timing of the policy change. If this assessment is 
correct, then the major motivation for Bill C-31 was not treaty-induced compliance with the 
ICCPR, but an exogenous change in Canada’s constitutional structure. 
 Before explaining my reasons, I will discuss and reject two possibilities that would be 
consistent with Lovelace having had a determinative effect on the timing. The first might be 
phrased like this: while the ultimate timing of Bill C-31 was determined by the enactment of 
Charter, one of the federal government’s objectives in designing the Charter was to ensure that it 
would make Indian Act section 12(1)(b) unconstitutional, thus bringing Canadian policy into 
compliance with Lovelace. There are at least two good reasons for doubting this. First, as several 
contemporary commentators noted, it is not at all clear from the final language of the Charter 
that it would have had this effect on Indian Act section 12(1)(b). (Zlotkin 1983: 47; Schwartz 
1986: 334; Hosek 1983: 295; Dalon 1985: 103) Had rendering Indian Act section 12(1)(b) 
unconstitutional been a priority, surely the drafters would have made the relationship between 
the relevant sections (15, 25, 28) more clear. A second reason for rejecting this hypothesis is that 
the drafters did not treat the elements of the constitutional package that were most relevant to the 
section 12(1)(b) issue as a priority. For instance, after the final constitutional negotiations in 
November 1981 the Prime Minister was unclear on the constitutional status of the section 
guaranteeing sexual equality (section 28) and the final section recognizing aboriginal and treaty 
rights (section 35) contained no provision on sexual equality. (See Hosek 1983; Sanders 1983)  
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 Another possibility that would be consistent with Lovelace having had a determinative 
effect involves the 1983 First Ministers Conference on Aboriginal Constitutional Matters. This 
conference produced a constitutional amendment that added a statement on sexual equality to 
Section 35.8 This would constitute evidence of Lovelace having had a determinative effect if it 
could be shown that the federal government desired this amendment to ensure that section 
12(1)(b) would be found unconstitutional. Again, I will suggest two reasons for doubting this. 
First, the federal government said that it did not want the amendment. I have found no reason to 
doubt the sincerity of its claim that the amendment was unnecessary because existing guarantees 
in the Charter were sufficient. (Canada 1983: 223) I accept that the amendment was made to 
satisfy concerns being pressed by the Native Council of Canada, the Native Women’s 
Association of Canada, and the Inuit Committee on National Issues. (Gaffney, Gould & Semple: 
44; see, also, e.g., Gottfriedson in Canada 1983: 253) Second, it is not at all clear that the final 
wording of the amendment – it refers to ‘existing aboriginal and treating rights,’ not the Indian 
Act – would actually have clarified the constitutionality of section 12(1)(b). (Dalon 1985: 67) 
 This brings us to a crucial question: if the federal government really believed that the 
courts would find Indian Act section 12(1)(b) unconstitutional when Charter section 15 came 
into effect in 1985, why did it take on the very troublesome task of amending the Indian Act? In 
the remainder of this section, I consider two distinct, but not mutually exclusive, possibilities. 
 The first, which is consistent with the hypothesis that Lovelace had an effect, is that the 
government wanted to resolve the matter so as to address the embarrassment it was experiencing 
as a result of Lovelace.9 This is suggested by a statement of the Minister of Indian Affairs at the 
1983 constitutional conference: “… even if we waited for the charter and put up with the 
injustice for that period of time, to take effect, it would do nothing for the Sandra Lovelace case, 
because it would not be retroactive, that is our legal advice.” (Canada 1983: 229) While this may 
have been part of the reason, I cannot accept that that was the government’s primary motivation. 
As the Minister himself noted, if the courts did not make their decision retroactive, it would 
always be open to the government to address this with legislation at a later date. Further, given 
all the years the government had deferred to act, there is something distinctly odd about the 
claim that now that the government was sure the situation would be addressed by the courts, it 
felt compelled to legislate.  
 A second possibility is that the government did not want the matter to be decided by the 
courts. The hypothesis here is that the government was motivated by concerns about cost 
containment. Given uncertainty about the application of the Charter to section 12(1)(b), it was 
possible that a court might have imposed a remedy requiring very costly amendments to the 
Indian Act. A worst-case scenario, from the cost-containment perspective, would have had the 
court recognize the ability to share Indian status with one’s spouse as an aboriginal right and then 
                                                 
8
 Section 35 (4) reads: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the aboriginal and treaty rights referred to 
in subsection (1) are guaranteed equally to male and female persons.” 
9
 This hypothesis would be more convincing if it could be established that the government was actually 
experiencing such pressure. While one gets the impression that this was the case from Hansard and domestic news 
reports, there is a surprising dearth of references, critical or otherwise, in the international press. Searching 
LexisNexis, ProQuest, The New York Times, Le Monde, and the Sydney Morning Herald, my research assistants 
could find only six stories between 1980 and 1985. The ambiguous status of external pressure is also suggested by 
Professor Donald Fleming who told a 1982 Commons committee that while a Canadian colleague of his who 
worked as a judge on the European Court of Human Rights felt the situation was a “… severe embarrassment, [his] 
colleagues at External Affairs seem to think this thing could possibly hold on for years and years and years.” 
(Canada 1982: 2: 99-100) 
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insist that this right be enjoyed equally by male and female Indians. Since constitutional 
interpretations are very difficult for governments to undo after the fact, pre-emptive action would 
have been implicated. While I have found no evidence that this specific scenario was being 
considered, there is plenty of evidence that the linkage between rules governing Indian status and 
financial implications was on the minds of federal policy makers.10 
 In short, the evidence suggests that the timing of Bill C-31 was determined by concerns 
associated with the constitutional deadline of April 1985, not by Lovelace.    
Did Lovelace Influence the Shape of the Policy Outcome? To this point, the evidence 
suggests that Lovelace did not put the issue of section 12(1)(b) on the political agenda, it did not 
change the government’s position on the issue, and it had little or no effect on the timing of the 
government’s action. This still leaves open the possibility that Lovelace had a determinative 
effect by influencing the eventual shape of the policy. This does not, however, appear to have 
been the case.  
This can be demonstrated by comparing the HRC’s view in Lovelace to the federal 
government’s policy as reflected in Bill C-31. We can begin by noting the key elements in 
Lovelace. First, the HRC decided that as Ms. Lovelace had married a non-Indian, and thus lost 
her Indian status, before Canada ratified the ICCPR in 1976, it could not rule on the factor that 
caused her to lose her status (i.e., sexual discrimination) (para. 10). Second, despite this, the 
HRC decided that it could consider “… the continuing effect of the Indian Act,” which was that 
Ms. Lovelace was denied the right to reside on her reserve. (para. 13.1) Third, it considered the 
most applicable right to be found in ICCPR article 27 which reads (para. 13.2): “In those States 
in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities 
shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their 
own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language”. Fourth, 
even though Ms. Lovelace was not considered a status Indian under the Indian Act, the HRC 
decided that she was a member of the Tobique Maliseet band for the purposes of article 27 
because “… [p]ersons who are born and brought up on a reserve, who have kept ties with their 
community and wish to maintain those ties must normally be considered as belonging to that 
minority within the meaning of the Covenant”. (para. 14) Fifth, while the HRC accepted that 
restrictions on the right of residence may be consistent with article 27 (para. 15), it said “… that 
statutory restrictions affecting the right to residence on a reserve of a person belonging to the 
minority concerned, must have both a reasonable and objective justification and be consistent 
with the other provisions of the Covenant, read as a whole”. (para. 16) Thus, finally, given the 
circumstances particular to Ms. Lovelace’s case, denying her the right to reside on the reserve 
could not be considered “… reasonable, or necessary to preserve the identity of the tribe [and 
thus] to prevent her recognition as belonging to the band is an unjustifiable denial of her rights 
under article 27”. (para. 17) The crucial aspect of this view was summarized by Professor 
Donald Fleming who said the HRC had found Canada to be “… in violation of the protection to 
ethnic and linguistic minorities because it has deprived one member of an ethnic and linguistic 
minority from the right to associate with others of that same ethnic and linguistic minority. The 
fact it happened to be a woman is irrelevant.” (Canada 1982: 2: 104) 
                                                 
10
 For instance, addressing aboriginal leaders at the 1983 first ministers conference, Prime Minister Trudeau said, 
“If … you want to have a tribal membership, I think it is for you to decide and for us to accept, providing we don’t 
have to pay the consequences of what you decide ...”. (Canada 1983: 262) See also comments of the Minister of 
Indian Affairs in Canada 1982: 1: 25. 
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 This key element of the HRC’s view was not reflected in Bill C-31, which has been 
described as a compromise between the major interests in what I have called the Indian-status 
policy community. It addressed the federal government’s and the non-native women’s 
movement’s interests by removing sexually discriminatory sections from the Act. It partially 
addressed the interests of Indian women who had been deprived of their status by reinstating 
them as well as their immediate children. It went some distance toward addressing the concerns 
of the status Indian organizations by separating the rules governing Indian status, which dealt 
primarily with rights to entitlements provided by the federal government, from those governing 
band membership, which dealt primarily with the right to reside on reserve. This would allow the 
government to retain control over status (and thus costs) while allowing Indian bands the 
opportunity to take greater control of their membership if they so chose. A key exception to band 
control, however, was that reinstated women (but not their children) were automatically 
reinstated to band membership (11(1)(c)). As Weaver noted, this was also likely to offer the 
government other benefits since the “… policy of assigning residency control to the bands and, at 
the same time, making financial support initially uncertain, significantly reduced the chances of 
reinstated First Nations women actually receiving these benefits [i.e., the more expensive ones 
associated with on-reserve status Indians]…. [It] also transferred the politically difficult 
decisions on residency from Ottawa to the First Nation’s communities.” (1993: 126)  
 The aspects of the policy reflected in Bill C-31 that are most clearly inconsistent with 
Lovelace are those that govern how Indian status is to be determined in the future. According to 
the amended Indian Act, a person is entitled to Indian status under subsection 6(1) if both of his 
or her parents were status Indians, or under subsection 6(2), if one of his or her parents was 
entitled to be registered under subsection 6(1). By implication, a person, one or both of whose 
parents was entitled to status under subsection 6(2) and neither was entitled under 6(1), would 
not be entitled to Indian status. While such children are not entitled to Indian status, they are 
entitled to reside on reserve with their status parent(s) so long as they are considered dependents 
(Indian Act section 18(1)). Without status of their own, however, these children would lose the 
right to reside on reserve once they reach the age of maturity (although the band could exercise 
its discretion under Bill C-31 to include them on its band list). This means, contrary to the 
HRC’s view in Lovelace, under Bill C-31 people “… who are born and brought up on a reserve, 
who have kept ties with their community and wish to maintain those ties” (para. 14) can be 
denied the right to live on their reserve.11 It is highly unlikely that this problem was inadvertent 
as it was brought to government’s attention on numerous occasions.12  
A further reason for suggesting that Lovelace did not contribute significantly to the shape 
of the policy in Bill C-31 is that that policy actually appears to predate Lovelace. Bill C-31 is 
very similar in substance to a policy the Department of Indian Affairs had proposed in a 
discussion paper in 1978.13 
                                                 
11 The HRC has also criticized the amendment because it “… affects only the woman and her children, not 
subsequent generations, which may still be denied membership in the community.” (UN 2000: para. 19) 
12 See, for example, presentations before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development by the National Action Committee on the Status of Women; (Canada 1985: 15: 7) the Native 
Council of Canada; (Canada 1985: 18:21, 30) and the Quebec Native Women’s Association. (Canada 1985: 24:7ff)  
13 Like C-31, the 1978 proposal suggested that marriage not affect Indian status (i.e., Indians would not lose it or 
non-Indians gain it), first generation children of mixed marriages would retain status, but children of second 
generation mixed marriages would not, and bands could opt to make non-status Indians “band beneficiaries”. 
(DIAND 1978: 2-3) 
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 In sum, as Bill C-31 does not satisfy key requirements of Lovelace and it is very similar 
to proposals the government was considering prior to the HRC’s decision in 1981, I conclude 
that Lovelace did not significantly influence the shape of the government’s policy.  
 
Case Study: Conclusion 
Thus, contrary to the popular boomerang pattern narrative, passage of Bill C-31 does not provide 
evidence of the effectiveness of the ICCPR: the case study only produced evidence to support 
two of the three elements required to demonstrate that Lovelace had a determinative effect; and, 
further, the legislation itself did not comply with the HRC’s view. This said, and so as not to 
paint too bleak a picture, I should note that, while Bill C-31 did not comply with ICCPR article 
27, it was a positive change to the extent that it brought the Indian Act into greater compliance 
with sexual equality provisions in ICCPR articles 2 and 26. 
 
FURTHER DISCUSSION: BOOMERANG OR BACKFIRE? 
Having concluded that Lovelace did not have a determinative effect on the passage of Bill C-31, 
and thus rejecting the boomerang as an appropriate narrative for describing its impact, we must 
consider whether backfire presents a superior alternative. That backfire might do so is suggested 
by a clever strategy the federal government appears to have employed. This allowed it to take 
advantage of a weakness in the ICCPR’s treaty compliance system to use Lovelace to help secure 
passage of legislation that, as we have seen, did not comply with key elements of the view.  
Even prior to the publication of Lovelace in 1981, the federal government appears to have 
been employing a strategy designed to reduce the resistance of the status Indian organizations to 
its desired Indian-status policy. If successful, this would shift the balance of power in the Indian-
status policy community enough to break the policy logjam. This strategy involved portraying 
status Indian organizations as the main impediment to removing sexual discrimination from the 
Indian Act. This appears to have involved deflecting any criticism the government received 
about sexual discrimination onto these organizations. (See Boldt and Long 1985: 173-174 for a 
similar view.) This is nicely illustrated by the response of Prime Minister Trudeau (1980: 2588) 
to a critical question he received in the Commons concerning Ms. Lovelace’s communication: 
“… Perhaps the case being decided at the United Nations will help persuade the Indian leaders 
themselves that they should be moving in this direction.”14 Thus, as Weaver writes, “… 
governmental members may well have welcomed [the embarrassment generated by Lovelace] 
given their desire to remove the discriminatory sections of the Indian Act.” (1983: 72) The 
success of this strategy was suggested at the 1983 first ministers conference when the status 
Indian organizations basically abandoned their attempts to link progress on the sexual equality 
issue to progress on all other forms of inequality in the Indian Act. (See, e.g., George Erasmus in 
Canada 1983: 243.) The final effect was, of course, the successful passage of amendments to the 
Indian Act that failed to comply with Lovelace, the goals of status Indian organizations, or the 
full desires of the Indian women and their children who had lost their status. 
 To understand why the Lovelace boomerang could be made to backfire in this way, we 
must ask how it was possible for the Canadian government to use the HRC’s view that it was 
violating the rights of Indians as members of a cultural minority to weaken the position of status 
Indian organizations. Canada could do this, I believe, because this key aspect of the HRC’s view 
was not disseminated to the Canadian public. Simply put, the subtlety and substance of the view 
                                                 
14 For similar examples, see Canada 1983: 218-9; Winnipeg Free Press 1983; The Globe and Mail 1984. For 
evidence that, as Prime Minister, Joe Clark used this strategy, see Silman 1987: 164. 
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did not make it through the media filter: as represented in media reports, the assumption seems to 
have been that since Lovelace won, the HRC must have decided the case on the basis of sexual 
discrimination.15 The federal government, of course, had no incentive to set the record straight; 
as Mitchell suggests, ambiguity about obligations “… ‘naturally’ leads states to interpret treaty 
rules so they can behave as their interests dictate while claiming their behaviour is in 
compliance.” (1996: 7) I believe it was this failure of dissemination that made it possible for the 
government to present Bill C-31 to the Canadian people as an adequate response to Lovelace.  
If we ask how this backfire effect might be avoided in the future, two observations come 
to mind. First, we are led to the obvious conclusion that increasing the transparency of the 
ICCPR’s compliance information system remains one of the keys to improving its effectiveness. 
Lest this be thought a purely historical concern, it should be noted that while the HRC has taken 
measures to improve transparency (see, for example, Ghandhi 1998: 338-342), Canada has yet to 
satisfy the HRC that it has complied with Lovelace. A second observation is that transparency, 
by its very nature, is not something the HRC can address entirely on its own. Much also depends 
upon the education of the lawyers and journalists whose role it is to introduce and interpret the 
decisions of international bodies into Canadian and other domestic contexts. This raises 
interesting questions, which I cannot pursue here, about how the effectiveness of international 
human rights treaties may be affected by the degree of congruence between values held in 
domestic political contexts and those advanced internationally.16 What seems clear is that the 
impact of the HRC’s view in Lovelace was hampered by incongruence between the values upon 
which it was decided, and the values through which it was interpreted in the Canadian context. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article set out to introduce a methodology for assessing the effectiveness of international 
human rights treaties and to demonstrate the efficacy of this model through a case study 
involving the HRC’s view in Lovelace v. Canada. Having identified problems with the popular 
story about the impact of Lovelace, discovered a strategy by which the federal government 
appears to have made the Lovelace ‘boomerang’ backfire, and pointed out some of the problems 
that allowed this strategy to succeed, I suggest the value of this methodology has been 
demonstrated. 
                                                 
15 For example, The Globe and Mail 1981; Toronto Star 1981; and Montreal Gazette 1981.  
16 I wish to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for drawing this out of my analysis. 
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